[tor-dev] Proposal: Stop giving Exit flags when only unencrypted traffic can exit

[Tim Wilson-Brown - teor]

> On 7 Jan 2016, at 02:23, Virgil Griffith <i at virgil.gr> wrote:
> 
> I would argue that the existence of this longer policy discussion, with no obvious solution, is why it behoves us to separate policy (as much as possible) from Tor's core mechanism.

As far as I understand the code, clients choose exit relays based on their exit policies, not the exit flag.
The exit flag is used for bandwidth weight load-balancing and logging during bootstrap, but that's about all.

So I'm not sure this proposal will have any effect on the Tor network, apart from perhaps a minor social effect if people are seeking flags for their relays. (Nor will it have much effect on policy, except, again, for a minor social effect.)

Tim

Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
PGP 968F094B

teor at blah dot im
OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/attachments/20160108/368dbeb8/attachment-0001.html>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 842 bytes
Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/attachments/20160108/368dbeb8/attachment-0001.sig>