[tor-dev] Proposal: Stop giving Exit flags when only unencrypted traffic can exit

[Virgil Griffith]

I would argue that the existence of this longer policy discussion, with no
obvious solution, is why it behoves us to separate policy (as much as
possible) from Tor's core mechanism.

-V
On Wed, 6 Jan 2016 at 21:42 Peter Tonoli <peter+tor at metaverse.org> wrote:

> Quoting Tim Wilson-Brown - teor <teor2345 at gmail.com>:
> > If we ensure that Exits must pass some encrypted traffic, then
> > running an Exit is less attractive to an adversary.
>
> I'd argue that it's marginally less attractive. They still have the
> opportunity to inspect some unencrypted traffic.
>
> > And even adversaries contribute useful, secure bandwidth to the Tor
> Network.
>
> This could also potentially backfire: adversaries can create local
> (non-tor) policies to throttle encrypted exit traffic, while not
> throttling unencrypted traffic.
>
> Peter..
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> tor-dev mailing list
> tor-dev at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/attachments/20160106/5ba973eb/attachment.html>