[tor-talk] Tor users trackable with common proxy?

[miniBill]

Il 21 febbraio 2012 09:09, Andrew Lewman <andrew at torproject.org> ha scritto:
> On Mon, 20 Feb 2012 16:15:37 +0800
> Koh Choon Lin <2choonlin at gmail.com> wrote:
>> "The authorities in Singapore are understood to have the ability to
>> track down a person online even if he or she uses anonymizing
>> facilities such as Virtual Private Networking, TOR onion routing, or
>> other forms of proxy servers, and even if encryption is involved. This
>> is because all internet traffic in Singapore is directed through a
>> common proxy choke with date, time and IP stamping operation in
>> place."
>
> It's plausible they record all transit through their single internet
> connection to non-Singapore world. Here are my thoughts, sort of based
> on https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#Torisdifferent faq
> answer.
>
> This collected information could give them tor clients talking to the
> public list of tor relays or known tor bridges.
>
> They have deployed a DPI device that can recognize the tor handshake
> and are recording the tor client to relay handshake.
>
> In both of these cases, they can only identify that you may be using
> tor, not what you're doing.
>
> Using obfsproxy could defeat both of the above issues.
>

Paranoid mode: on
They intercept the initial bootstrapping and make you connect
to a "fake" tor network composed of malicious nodes only.
Is it feasible?