[tor-talk] Tor users trackable with common proxy?

[Andrew Lewman]

On Mon, 20 Feb 2012 16:15:37 +0800
Koh Choon Lin <2choonlin at gmail.com> wrote:
> "The authorities in Singapore are understood to have the ability to
> track down a person online even if he or she uses anonymizing
> facilities such as Virtual Private Networking, TOR onion routing, or
> other forms of proxy servers, and even if encryption is involved. This
> is because all internet traffic in Singapore is directed through a
> common proxy choke with date, time and IP stamping operation in
> place."

It's plausible they record all transit through their single internet
connection to non-Singapore world. Here are my thoughts, sort of based
on https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#Torisdifferent faq
answer.

This collected information could give them tor clients talking to the
public list of tor relays or known tor bridges. 

They have deployed a DPI device that can recognize the tor handshake
and are recording the tor client to relay handshake. 

In both of these cases, they can only identify that you may be using
tor, not what you're doing. 

Using obfsproxy could defeat both of the above issues.

-- 
Andrew
http://tpo.is/contact
pgp 0x74ED336B