keys?

[Ringo Kamens]

Perhaps tor could generate like 100 keys when it starts, before it
starts making connections. That way, it can cycle through those keys
for all the different connections.

On 5/16/06, glymr <glymr_darkmoon at ml1.net> wrote:
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> Matej Kovacic wrote:
> > OK, the problem is what if authority force you to reveal the keys?
> >
> > I am sure you all know this:
> >
> > http://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/Protocol-v2-3.0.0.html
> > Perfect forward secrecy
> >     If you lose control of your private keys, no previous conversation
> > is compromised.
> >
> > Why not to add aditional feature: to generate keys each time Tor is
> > started (or even for each "conversation")?
> >
> > Then you have perfect forward secrecy AND also future secrecy (except an
> > attacker steals key for each "conversation" at the beginning of it). And
> > if keys are not stored anywhere, you can't give them.
> >
> >
> > Or this has already been discussed and I am missing something?
> > bye, Matej
>
> Problem is that key generation with adequate entropy levels is time and
> processor intensive. It all depends on how big your keys are tho. I use
> a 4096 bit pgp key and it often takes up to 5 minutes to generate a new
> key. With a hardware RNG it's not so bad, but with a software one you
> are dependent on stochastic phenomena disrupting the orderliness of the
> computer's executions stream.
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