keys?

[glymr]

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Matej Kovacic wrote:
> OK, the problem is what if authority force you to reveal the keys?
> 
> I am sure you all know this:
> 
> http://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/Protocol-v2-3.0.0.html
> Perfect forward secrecy
>     If you lose control of your private keys, no previous conversation
> is compromised.
> 
> Why not to add aditional feature: to generate keys each time Tor is
> started (or even for each "conversation")?
> 
> Then you have perfect forward secrecy AND also future secrecy (except an
> attacker steals key for each "conversation" at the beginning of it). And
> if keys are not stored anywhere, you can't give them.
> 
> 
> Or this has already been discussed and I am missing something?
> bye, Matej

Problem is that key generation with adequate entropy levels is time and
processor intensive. It all depends on how big your keys are tho. I use
a 4096 bit pgp key and it often takes up to 5 minutes to generate a new
key. With a hardware RNG it's not so bad, but with a software one you
are dependent on stochastic phenomena disrupting the orderliness of the
computer's executions stream.
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iD8DBQFEaZ3kGkOzwaes7JsRAwZ9AJ9iZHEbAGuFH4JjtJyyv6fSFAht3QCfeKaV
vaV700/gaShGuUPeSMcJgZQ=
=4+4O
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