[tor-dev] Sharing Circuits Between Onion Servers and Clients

[Holmes Wilson]

And some email clients like mine even include the trailing "." in the link!

Third time's the charm: https://github.com/devnetsec/rand_num_consensus <https://github.com/devnetsec/rand_num_consensus>

On Tue Oct 22, 2024, 10:48 AM GMT, Georg Koppen <mailto:gk at torproject.org> wrote:
> stifle_savage042--- via tor-dev:
>> Hi all,
>>
>> I want to promote some recent work of mine in the hope that someone here will find it interesting or useful. In my most concise language, it is a "decentralized, asynchronous entropy generator protocol." I've made a somewhat complete demo implementation so far. Here's the repository: https://github.com/devnetsec/rand-num-consensus. The
>
> FWIW the correct link is: https://github.com/devnetsec/rand_num_consensus.
>
> Georg
>
> integrity of the entropy can only be compromised if all nodes in the
> ring are malicious and coinciding. Currently, a Tor client cannot
> anonymously connect to an onion service by directly contacting the
> rendezvous point, because that relay could have been chosen maliciously
> by the onion server. I wager that a scheme like this could enable onion
> servers and clients to share the same circuit. Both parties would have a
> guarantee that their relays were chosen randomly.
>>
>> The most similar solution I could find to this was in the TorCoin paper, but it appears to require a more complicated zero-knowledge proof. If there is serious interest in this, I'd be willing to write a proposal draft. Besides implementation difficulty, is there any outstanding flaw in this idea?
>>
>> Best Regards,
>> Dylan Downey [devnetsec]
>>
>>
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