[tor-dev] Sharing Circuits Between Onion Servers and Clients

[Georg Koppen]

stifle_savage042--- via tor-dev:
> Hi all,
> 
> I want to promote some recent work of mine in the hope that someone here will find it interesting or useful. In my most concise language, it is a "decentralized, asynchronous entropy generator protocol." I've made a somewhat complete demo implementation so far. Here's the repository: https://github.com/devnetsec/rand-num-consensus. The 

FWIW the correct link is: https://github.com/devnetsec/rand_num_consensus.

Georg

integrity of the entropy can only be compromised if all nodes in the 
ring are malicious and coinciding. Currently, a Tor client cannot 
anonymously connect to an onion service by directly contacting the 
rendezvous point, because that relay could have been chosen maliciously 
by the onion server. I wager that a scheme like this could enable onion 
servers and clients to share the same circuit. Both parties would have a 
guarantee that their relays were chosen randomly.
> 
> The most similar solution I could find to this was in the TorCoin paper, but it appears to require a more complicated zero-knowledge proof. If there is serious interest in this, I'd be willing to write a proposal draft. Besides implementation difficulty, is there any outstanding flaw in this idea?
> 
> Best Regards,
> Dylan Downey [devnetsec]
> 
> 
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