[tor-dev] [RFC] Proposal for the encoding of prop224 onion addresses
George Kadianakis
desnacked at riseup.net
Tue Jan 24 12:27:43 UTC 2017
s7r <s7r at sky-ip.org> writes:
> Hello George,
>
> George Kadianakis wrote:
>> Hello list,
>>
>> we've had discussions over the past years about how to encode prop224 onion
>> addresses. Here is the latest thread: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-December/011734.html
>>
>> Bikeshedding is over; it's time to finally pick a scheme! My suggested scheme
>>
>> <snip>
>>
>
> The version field is useful and allows room for much stuff that we might
> need to do. I think it would be better to place it at the end of the
> address. I don't think all addresses should start with the same prefix
> tbh - this will make them slightly less distinguishable (as much as
> possible users should be able to differentiate onion addresses, which
> are re-usable for long term, as opposite to Bitcoin where the
> recommended way is to use 1 address 1 time, different one every time and
> the users just need to see a string that looks and reads like a Bitcoin
> address and just make sure it's copied (scanned) from/to the right place).
>
OK thanks for the useful discussion. I identified at least three feedback points:
+ Screw base58 it's not gonna work. We stick to base32. Usability will
be "restored" with a proper name system.
+ Move version byte to the end of the address to avoid constant
prefix. Moving version byte to the middle as teor suggested would
cause forward-compatibility issues.
+ My checksum calculations were wrong. Checksum is strong! 2 bytes are enough.
And given the above, here is the new microproposal:
onion_address = base32(pubkey || checksum || version)
checksum = SHA3(".onion checksum" || pubkey || version)
where:
pubkey is 32 bytes ed25519 pubkey
version is one byte (default value for prop224: '\x03')
checksum hash is truncated to two bytes
Here are a few example addresses (with broken checksum):
l5satjgud6gucryazcyvyvhuxhr74u6ygigiuyixe3a6ysis67ororad.onion
btojiu7nu5y5iwut64eufevogqdw4wmqzugnoluw232r4t3ecsfv37ad.onion
vckjr6bpchiahzhmtzslnl477hdfvwhzw7dmymz3s5lp64mwf6wfeqad.onion
Checksum strength: The checksum has a false negative rate of 1/65536.
Address handling: Clients handling onion addresses first parse the
version field, then extract pubkey, then verify checksum.
Let me know how you feel about this one. If people like it I will
transcribe it to prop224.
Thanks again Ivan, Ian, Linda, teor, s7r, Chelsea :)
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