[tor-dev] [RFC] Proposal for the encoding of prop224 onion addresses
s7r
s7r at sky-ip.org
Tue Jan 24 01:51:21 UTC 2017
Hello George,
George Kadianakis wrote:
> Hello list,
>
> we've had discussions over the past years about how to encode prop224 onion
> addresses. Here is the latest thread: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-December/011734.html
>
> Bikeshedding is over; it's time to finally pick a scheme! My suggested scheme
> basically follows from the discussion on that thread, and is heavily based on
> the Bitcoin address format:
> https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Base58Check_encoding
> https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Technical_background_of_version_1_Bitcoin_addresses
>
> Here is the suggested scheme:
>
> onion_address = base32(version + pubkey + checksum)
> checksum = SHA3(".onion checksum" + version + pubkey)
>
> where:
> pubkey is 32 bytes (ed25519)
> version is one byte
> checksum is _truncated_ to two bytes
>
> With the above construction onion_address ends up being 56 bytes long
> (excluding the ".onion"):
>
> tbi5tdxbosiotphawjyu7f5pw5tlnvbvfjrj7meskbsnwr2bqbu2t4gg.onion
> tcrdnadkefvbdm3u56kz6lfh6v5lr24fpog5vzsy4n3djr2ymueu34ws.onion
> tcdw7lwmtp5pbwj2w7wf6amxdhmc62qitj2teu376r5s2fqke4r3uiq6.onion
>
> If people like the above suggestion, I will take the effort to engrave it in
> prop224.
>
> Here is the discussion section. Please provide feedback!
>
> [D1] How to use version field:
>
> The version field is one byte long. If we use it as an integer we can
> encode 256 values in it; if we use it as a bitmap we could encode
> properties and such.
>
> My suggestion is to simply use it as an integer like Bitcoin does. So we
> can assign value \x01 to normal onion services, and in the future we can
> assign more version tags if we need to. For example, we can give a
> different version field to onion services in the testnet. We can also
> reserve a range of values for application-specific purposes.
>
> [D1.1] Default version value:
>
> The next question is what version value to assign to normal onion
> services. In the above scheme where:
>
> onion_address = base32(version + pubkey + checksum)
>
> the value of 'version' basically determines the first two characters of
> the onion address. In Bitcoin, they've made it such that the default
> version value basically prefixes addresses with "1"; so all normal
> Bitcoin addresses start with 1 as in 14tDWDT9zqDufWZmiLqoaT9qJyHi7RRZPE
>
> What should we do in Tor? My suggestion is to use '\x98' as the default
> version value which prefixes all addresses with 't' (as in Tor). Check
> the examples I cited above.
>
> An alternative is to turn the scheme to:
> onion_address = base32(pubkey + checksum + version)
> where the version byte is at the end with no effect at usability.
>
> A heavier alternative would be to have two bytes of version so that we
> can just prefix them all with 'tor'...
>
The version field is useful and allows room for much stuff that we might
need to do. I think it would be better to place it at the end of the
address. I don't think all addresses should start with the same prefix
tbh - this will make them slightly less distinguishable (as much as
possible users should be able to differentiate onion addresses, which
are re-usable for long term, as opposite to Bitcoin where the
recommended way is to use 1 address 1 time, different one every time and
the users just need to see a string that looks and reads like a Bitcoin
address and just make sure it's copied (scanned) from/to the right place).
> [D2] Checksum strength:
>
> In the suggested scheme we use a hash-based checksum of two bytes (16 bits).
> This means that in case of an address typo, we have 1/65536 probability
> to not detect the error (false negative). It also means that after 256
> typos we will have 50% probability to miss an error (happy birthday!).
>
> I feel like the above numbers are pretty good given the small checksum size.
>
Yes, the numbers are very good.
> The alternative would be to make the checksum four bytes (like in
> Bitcoin). This would _greatly_ increase the strength of our checksum but
> it would also increase our address length by 4 base32 characters (and
> also force us to remove leading padding from base32 output). This is how
> these 60-character addresses look like:
>
> tc2dty3zowj6oyhbyb5n3a2h3luztlx22hy2cwdvn37omsv7quy7rxiysn3a.onion
> tbdczrndtadzdhb6iyemnxf7f4i6x7yojnunarlrvt2virtmrecmwgx5golq.onion
> tc6pcgyorusw3jj5tosxakmcwfmcend2q4g2qnbjtkhuuh4dcgvs4rl4rdaa.onion
>
> You probably don't notice the size difference compared to the
> 56-character addresses, which perhaps is an argument for adopting a four
> byte checksum. Let me know what you think about this.
>
I don't think so. I think our best bet is a checksum of 2 bytes, this
offers sufficient strength for our use cases.
> [D3] Do we like base32???
>
> In this proposal I suggest we keep the base32 encoding since we've been
> using it for a while; but this is the perfect time to switch if we feel
> the need to.
>
> For example, Bitcoin is using base58 which is much more compact than
> base32, and also has much better UX properties than base64:
> https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Base58Check_encoding#Background
>
> If we wanted to get a more compact encoding, we could adopt base58 or
> make our own adaptation of it. In this proposal I'm using base32 for
> everything, but I could be persuaded that now is the time to use a better
> encoding.
>
> Let me know what you think!
>
When talking about > 50 chars strings, I think memorizing is (for most
users at least) very hard, regardless if encoding is base58 or base32.
What I think is more important is that onion addresses should not
contain upper case and lower case characters, they should look as much
as possible like regular DNS hostnames. For this reason I would go for
base32 here.
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