[tor-dev] How many exits exit from an IP address different than their OR address? (10.7%)
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) - lists
lists at infosecurity.ch
Tue Jan 12 10:01:34 UTC 2016
On 1/12/16 4:43 AM, David Fifield wrote:
> I wanted to know how many exits exit from an address that is different
> from their OR address. The answer is about 10.7%, 109/1018 exits. The
> interesting part is that of those 109 mismatches, 87 have an exit
> address that differs from the OR address in all four octets; i.e., the
> IP addresses used by the exit are not even in the same /8.
It would be nice to prevent different IP traffic for Exit, unless
OutBoundBindAddress is defined and/or OutBoundExitAddress
(ie:https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17975) is
implemented and defined.
>From a "transparency" point of view, i think that any routing aspects
shall stay into the consensus database, so that it could be checked for
possible sign of manipulations.
If someone want to do asymmetric routing, then that information must be
in the consensus (IMHO).
--
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
HERMES - Center for Transparency and Digital Human Rights
http://logioshermes.org - https://globaleaks.org - https://tor2web.org -
https://ahmia.fi
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