[tor-dev] tor-dev Digest, Vol 60, Issue 2

[Zhenfei Zhang]

Hi Flipchan,

There are reference implementation of quantum-safe cryptographic
algorithms, such
as NTRU encryption algorithm (in libntruencrypt):
https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/NTRUEncrypt
and BLISS signature algorithm,
http://bliss.di.ens.fr/

Those are independent softwares. But for what I understand, common crypto
libraries,
such as crypto in openssl, libgcrypt, crypto++, do not have quantum-safe
crypto, except
wolfssl that supports NTRU.
https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl

We also have libgcrypt with NTRU supports,
https://github.com/wwhyte-si/libgcrypt-ntru
but it is not an official release.

Cheers,
Zhenfei


On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 5:49 PM, Flipchan <flipchan at riseup.net> wrote:

> How would u add quantum-safe
> crypto? I havent seen anyone puttin a pub lib that anyone can import
>
> tor-dev-request at lists.torproject.org skrev: (2 januari 2016 13:00:02 CET)
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>> Today's Topics:
>>
>>    1. Re: Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor (Ryan Carboni)
>>    2. Re: Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor (Yawning Angel)
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>>
>> Message: 1
>> Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2016 19:33:31 -0800
>> From: Ryan Carboni <ryacko at gmail.com>
>> To: tor-dev at lists.torproject.org
>> Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor
>> Message-ID:
>>  <CAO7N=i2MspE1N5eOczCyT9RCPORgUJboSOY3vUMGKL5FSzAPnw at mail.gmail.com>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>
>> The first step should be replacing the long-term keys with quantum-safe
>> crypto.
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>>
>> Message: 2
>> Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 04:19:28 +0000
>> From: Yawning Angel <yawning at schwanenlied.me>
>> To: tor-dev at lists.torproject.org
>> Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor
>> Message-ID: <20160102041928.15e0cbc3 at schwanenlied.me>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>>
>> On Fri, 1 Jan
>> 2016 19:33:31 -0800
>> Ryan Carboni <ryacko at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>  The first step should be replacing the long-term keys with
>>>  quantum-safe crypto.
>>>
>>
>> Wrong.
>>
>> There are NO usable PQ signature primitives that are suitable for
>> deployment.  Adding 1408+ bytes to every single microdescriptor is
>> not a realistic proposition.  Signing is also quite expensive unless you
>> have AVX2, and will decimate circuit build performance.
>>
>> Protecting against Quantum Computer equipped active Man-In-The-Middle
>> attacks is the least important thing to do in terms of user safety.
>>
>> By modifying the link handshake to incorporate a PQ key exchange
>> algorithm with ephemeral keys as in the proposal, user data being
>> generated right now will be protected from bulk decryption later, in
>> the event of
>> a Curve25519 break (probably by a large enough Quantum
>> Computer), which is a far more realistic threat to be concerned about.
>>
>>
> --
> Sincerly Flipchan
>
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