[tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor

[Tim Wilson-Brown - teor]

> On 3 Jan 2016, at 12:18, Ryan Carboni <ryacko at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> And yet the NSA is moving to prime numbers.
> 
> A large public key isn't a very good reason to not adopt quantum-safe crypto, it just means that it requires having the Tor project to be able to scale to a larger degree. I suggest hash tables, a percentage of which are pseudorandomly downloaded. Otherwise the Tor project won't scale to 10x the relays ... even ignoring quantum cryptography.

We had a GSOC project to produce "consensus diffs", so that clients could download the differences between each consensus each hour, rather than downloading a full consensus (~1.5MB).

It showed some great results, but still needs a little work before we merge it.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13339 <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13339>

Tim

Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
PGP 968F094B

teor at blah dot im
OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F

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