[tor-dev] tor-dev Digest, Vol 60, Issue 2

[Flipchan]

How would u add quantum-safe
crypto? I havent seen anyone puttin a pub lib that anyone can import

tor-dev-request at lists.torproject.org skrev: (2 januari 2016 13:00:02 CET)
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>Today's Topics:
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>   1. Re: Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor (Ryan Carboni)
>   2. Re: Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor (Yawning Angel)
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>----------------------------------------------------------------------
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>Message: 1
>Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2016 19:33:31 -0800
>From: Ryan Carboni <ryacko at gmail.com>
>To: tor-dev at lists.torproject.org
>Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor
>Message-ID:
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>The first step should be replacing the long-term keys with quantum-safe
>crypto.
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>Message: 2
>Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 04:19:28 +0000
>From: Yawning Angel <yawning at schwanenlied.me>
>To: tor-dev at lists.torproject.org
>Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor
>Message-ID: <20160102041928.15e0cbc3 at schwanenlied.me>
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
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>On Fri, 1 Jan 2016 19:33:31 -0800
>Ryan Carboni <ryacko at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> The first step should be replacing the long-term keys with
>> quantum-safe crypto.
>
>Wrong.
>
>There are NO usable PQ signature primitives that are suitable for
>deployment.  Adding 1408+ bytes to every single microdescriptor is
>not a realistic proposition.  Signing is also quite expensive unless
>you
>have AVX2, and will decimate circuit build performance.
>
>Protecting against Quantum Computer equipped active Man-In-The-Middle
>attacks is the least important thing to do in terms of user safety.
>
>By modifying the link handshake to incorporate a PQ key exchange
>algorithm with ephemeral keys as in the proposal, user data being
>generated right now will be protected from bulk decryption later, in
>the event of a Curve25519 break (probably by a large enough Quantum
>Computer), which is a far more realistic threat to be concerned about.
>
>-- 
>Yawning Angel
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>End of tor-dev Digest, Vol 60, Issue 2
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-- 
Sincerly Flipchan
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