[tor-dev] stopping the censoring of tor users.

[Thom Wiggers]

You may be interested in the following from the FAQ:

https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#HideExits

You should hide the list of Tor relays, so people can't block the exits.

There are a few reasons we don't:

a) We can't help but make the information available, since Tor clients
need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers" want it, they
can get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell clients about the
list of relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections
through Tor to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see.
b) If people want to block us, we believe that they should be allowed to
do so. Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow Tor users to
connect to them, but people have the right to decide who their services
should allow connections from, and if they want to block anonymous
users, they can.
c) Being blockable also has tactical advantages: it may be a persuasive
response to website maintainers who feel threatened by Tor. Giving them
the option may inspire them to stop and think about whether they really
want to eliminate private access to their system, and if not, what other
options they might have. The time they might otherwise have spent
blocking Tor, they may instead spend rethinking their overall approach
to privacy and anonymity.

On 25/02/16 20:04, blacklight . wrote:
> hello there! i don't know if this mailing list works but i thought of
> giving it a try.
>
> i was lately reading an article
> (http://www.pcworld.com/article/3037180/security/tor-users-increasingly-treated-like-second-class-web-citizens.html)
>  and it was about tor users getting blocked from accessing alot of
> website. but after giving this some thought i think i came up with a
> possible solution to the problem :there is a thing called bridges,
> they are used to access the tor network without your isp knowing that
> you use tor, but if you can use those proxies to enter the network, it
> might also be possible to exit the network with them. But then we face
> a second challenge, the exit nodes have to be configured in such a way
> that it will relay traffic to such a bridge, so the exit node owners
> also need to know the ip of the bridge. While this doesn't seem
> difficult to do, it can become difficult. You see if the bridges are
> published on a public list(like normal bridges are) then the blocking
> sites in question will be able to block those address too. While this
> also posses a problem, a possible solution could be found in something
> called flashproxies, flashproxies are bridges with a really short life
> span, they are created and destroyed fairly swiftly, when this is done
> in a rapid pace, they become really hard to block because the ip
> changes all the time. So if the exit nodes can be configured to make
> use of such flash proxies, then the problem could be solved. I Must
> admit that not an expert on this or anything, and it needs alot of
> more thought, but it could work. so i was wondering if there are any
> experts who could help me with thinking out this subject and maybe
> confirm if this idea could work.
>
>
> greetings, blacklight
>
>
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