[tor-dev] stopping the censoring of tor users.
blacklight .
pandakaasftw at gmail.com
Thu Feb 25 19:04:13 UTC 2016
hello there! i don't know if this mailing list works but i thought of
giving it a try.
i was lately reading an article (
http://www.pcworld.com/article/3037180/security/tor-users-increasingly-treated-like-second-class-web-citizens.html
)
and it was about tor users getting blocked from accessing alot of website.
but after giving this some thought i think i came up with a possible
solution to the problem :there is a thing called bridges, they are used to
access the tor network without your isp knowing that you use tor, but if
you can use those proxies to enter the network, it might also be possible
to exit the network with them. But then we face a second challenge, the
exit nodes have to be configured in such a way that it will relay traffic
to such a bridge, so the exit node owners also need to know the ip of the
bridge. While this doesn't seem difficult to do, it can become difficult.
You see if the bridges are published on a public list(like normal bridges
are) then the blocking sites in question will be able to block those
address too. While this also posses a problem, a possible solution could be
found in something called flashproxies, flashproxies are bridges with a
really short life span, they are created and destroyed fairly swiftly, when
this is done in a rapid pace, they become really hard to block because the
ip changes all the time. So if the exit nodes can be configured to make use
of such flash proxies, then the problem could be solved. I Must admit that
not an expert on this or anything, and it needs alot of more thought, but
it could work. so i was wondering if there are any experts who could help
me with thinking out this subject and maybe confirm if this idea could work.
greetings, blacklight
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