using Host Identity Protocol in Tor

[Nick Mathewson]

On Wed, Oct 18, 2006 at 05:31:53PM +0300, Andrei Gurtov wrote:
 [...]
> > I don't personally see a lot of point in encrypting the
> > port of the next OR to which you're talking.
> 
> Wouldn't that help hiding the TOR traffic so that it's not filtered out
> by firewalls based on port #?

No; Tor traffic doesn't use a fixed port number.  Did you read
tor-spec.txt like I suggested?  It would probably be helpful to get a
firm understanding of how the protocol works today before you start
redesigning it. :)

(And it's Tor, not TOR.)

 [...]
> Sounds like you see some potential benefits but not enough to interest
> someone of current Tor developers to add HIP support, is that right? How
> about if we try to make the HIP-TOR prototype sometimes next year to get
> some experience, would you consider adopting it then?

Personally, if somebody makes a working prototype of *anything* and it
turns out to work well and portably, that would make me take it more
seriously.  How seriously I'd take it would depend on how portable the
prototype was, what issues were encountered during its deployment,
whether its security had been specified and analyzed, and so on.

yrs,
-- 
Nick Mathewson
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