using Host Identity Protocol in Tor

[Andrei Gurtov]

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Nick Mathewson wrote:
> HIP looks like neat stuff, especially in its mobility features, but it
> doesn't seem very mature.  Generally, we'd like to avoid being early
> adopters of whiz-bang new features on the internet, since it's hard to
> say in advance how popular they will turn out to be.

Thanks, and HIP is indeed relatively fresh (though HIP was proposed in
1999, was it even before Tor became popular? ;-)
Deployment sounds a bit like chicken and egg problem, if new solutions
are not adopted they wouldn't be popular...


> I don't personally see a lot of point in encrypting the
> port of the next OR to which you're talking.

Wouldn't that help hiding the TOR traffic so that it's not filtered out
by firewalls based on port #?

> The mobility and DoS-prevention features of HIP look neat; servers are
> already authenticated in the current protocol.
> 
> Adding UDP support would be a major win, but it wouldn't be so simple
> as just switching to HIP; see the FAQ question about UDP support.

Sounds like you see some potential benefits but not enough to interest
someone of current Tor developers to add HIP support, is that right? How
about if we try to make the HIP-TOR prototype sometimes next year to get
some experience, would you consider adopting it then?

Andrei
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