[tor-bugs] #17945 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop Tor2Web connecting to (Rendezvous) Single Onion Services
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Fri Feb 23 12:01:09 UTC 2018
#17945: Stop Tor2Web connecting to (Rendezvous) Single Onion Services
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: teor | Owner: dgoulet
Type: enhancement | Status:
| needs_revision
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.3.3.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor2web, tor-hs, 029-proposed, 029 | Actual Points:
-teor-no, needs-design, needs-proposal-maybe, |
single-onion, review-group-33 |
Parent ID: #24962 | Points: 5
Reviewer: asn, teor | Sponsor:
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Changes (by teor):
* status: needs_review => needs_revision
Comment:
Good catch!
There should be no way we can get to this code without a p_chan, because
both circuits needed a p_chan at some point in the past to establish a
rendezvous. But we could accidentally add a bug like this in future.
If either circuit doesn't have a p_chan (because it's just been closed),
the rendezvous should fail.
So we should do the p_chan check and fail, because channel_is_client()
hard asserts on NULL channels.
Do you think we should BUG() if either p_chan is NULL?
I'm not sure, because channels can close by themselves, and I'm not sure
if they clean up all their circuits straight away.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17945#comment:47>
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