[tor-bugs] #13670 [Tor Browser]: ensure OCSP requests respect URL bar domain isolation
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Tue Jun 30 15:53:50 UTC 2015
#13670: ensure OCSP requests respect URL bar domain isolation
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Reporter: | Owner: arthuredelstein
arthuredelstein | Status: needs_review
Type: defect | Milestone:
Priority: major | Version:
Component: Tor | Keywords: tbb-linkability, ff38-esr,
Browser | MikePerry201505R, TorBrowserTeam201506R, tbb-5
Resolution: | .0a-highrisk
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by arthuredelstein):
Replying to [comment:44 mikeperry]:
> Replying to [comment:42 arthuredelstein]:
> > Here's a new fixup patch that addresses issues mentioned in comment:38
and comment:40. I fixed the code in nsHTTPDownloadEvent::Run by prepending
an "https://" scheme to the isolation domain.
> >
> > https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-
browser/commit/c95f25a009d421a7cf38e56cc4c6fe83ff43c438
> >
> > I tested this patch and confirmed that most OCSP requests are isolated
to the first party domain. However, some OCSP requests go on the No-First-
Party circuit, apparently because they are prompted by favicon requests or
Tor Browser update requests.
>
> This last case should be solved bu #16448, right?
Yes, in my manual tests, it is solved by #16448.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13670#comment:45>
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