[tor-bugs] #7112 [Tor]: tor_addr_is_internal_() - non-IP address of type 0
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
torproject-admin at torproject.org
Wed Oct 17 14:56:37 UTC 2012
#7112: tor_addr_is_internal_() - non-IP address of type 0
-----------------------------------+----------------------------------------
Reporter: mazda | Type: defect
Status: needs_review | Priority: major
Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final | Component: Tor
Version: | Keywords: tor_addr_is_internal
Parent: | Points:
Actualpoints: |
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Comment(by nickm):
Aha. We do copy the address over... but only conn->address, and not the
conn->addr field.
Okay, I've make a slightly less bold approach based on your analysis of
the bug. Instead of suppressing the output on all tunneled directory
connections, I've decided to include it on all tunneled directory
connections, and trust that the client's use of the still-misnamed
direct_connection field will make the client ignore that field on
anonymized tunneled connections.
This approach is "slightly less bold" because it leaves the addr field of
the directory connection alone, and instead finds out the right value to
report just as it is about to report the value. That way if anything is
relying on these addr fields being null, it won't break.
The computation for "the right address" is a little tricky, since it isn't
in dir_conn, and it isn't in the linked exit connection either. No, for
the apparent peer address, we need to ask the channel.
See branch 'bug7112_v2' in my public repository -- does that seem right?
One remaining mystery is why this warning appeared about when we merged
the channel code; I don't see any change that would make it start
happening.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7112#comment:10>
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