[tor-bugs] #3100 [TorBrowserButton]: Reduce security prefs into a few groups
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
torproject-admin at torproject.org
Thu Jul 19 20:22:01 UTC 2012
#3100: Reduce security prefs into a few groups
------------------------------------------+---------------------------------
Reporter: mikeperry | Owner: mikeperry
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: major | Milestone: TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable
Component: TorBrowserButton | Version:
Keywords: tbb-disk-leak, tbb-usability | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Changes (by mikeperry):
* keywords: tbb-disk-leak => tbb-disk-leak, tbb-usability
Old description:
> We should reduce the number of preferences into levels of security rather
> than the myriad of individual behavior controls we have now.
>
> Reducing the number of options can reduce the ability of users to
> fragment themselves into different anonymity sets through fingerprinting.
>
> Our translators will hate us for a while, but there will be less words to
> translate total.
>
> I want to get the set down to the following four options:
>
> - Block Plugins
> - Resist Fingerprinting
> - Record Browsing History on Disk
> - Record Tor Cookies on Disk
>
> I don't think we need much else. The rest of the options will remain
> buried in about:config.
>
> FYI: We need to disable "Permanent Private Browsing Mode" to allow us to
> record history again.
New description:
We should reduce the number of preferences into levels of security rather
than the myriad of individual behavior controls we have now.
Reducing the number of options can reduce the ability of users to fragment
themselves into different anonymity sets through fingerprinting.
Our translators will hate us for a while, but there will be less words to
translate total.
I want to get the set down to the following four options:
- Record Browsing History on Disk
- Record Tor Cookies on Disk
- Block Plugins
- Resist Fingerprinting
I don't think we need much else. The rest of the options will remain
buried in about:config.
The last two should also be removed once we get a better per-site Privacy
UI (see #5273 and the UI mockup in
https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#identifier-
linkability)
--
Comment:
Block plugins and resist fingerprinting should not be a global choices
long-term. See #5273 and the updated design doc.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3100#comment:10>
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