[tbb-dev] OneCRL

[Georg Koppen]

Tom Ritter:
> Would anyone be so kind to fill me in on how TB uses OneCRL, if at all?
> OneCRL being the revocation method of FF that allows high risk certs to be
> revoked without a browser update. Does TB disable it? Check it? (And if so,
> is it persisted to disk, which would leak approximate last runtime?)
> 
> I ask because a similar thing might be the way to go for proposal 273 and
> want to understand precedent/how this was considered in the past...

I have not looked if anything of our changes to Firefox code would
affect OneCRL. But we don't do anything special in this regard. I think
chances are very high that we are doing the same as vanilla Firefox.

Georg

> -tom
> 
> 
> 
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