[TWN team] Updates to the wiki pages

[dan]

What's the story behind these update emails? Are they reporting every
change or just major ones?


Lunar:
> ***************************************************************************
> CHANGED: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2013/9
> ***************************************************************************
> --- @	Tue, 03 Sep 2013 04:05:03 +0000
> +++ @	Tue, 03 Sep 2013 06:05:03 +0000
> @@ -70,35 +70,6 @@
>  this November in Berlin, Aaron Johnson, Chris Wacek, Rob Jansen, Micah
>  Sherr, and Paul Syverson described in a very well written paper their
>  experiments on traffic correlation attacks.
> -
> -Like any low latency anonymity network, Tor is vulnerable to “an
> -adversary that can observe a user’s traffic entering and exiting the
> -anonymity network.” The paper extensively review previous
> -litterature about this issue. But two angles used by the authors are of
> -particular interests:
> -
> -First, they are trying to model a “more realistic adversary who monitors
> -a fixed set of ASes or IXPs.” Second, they have tried to use metrics
> -that can answer the following questions: “If I use the system in the
> -following way, how secure am I?” or “How much can I do the following
> -while maintaining security at least to level foo?”
> -
> -Tor has users in the real world, with real world adversaries. Both
> -have resources that are limited to some extents, and it is good to
> -give Tor users a better chance to estimate their risks and necessary
> -tradeoffs.
> -
> -This lead the paper to focus on two class of attacks: “malicious relay
> -operators or networks that monitor traffic as it enters and exits Tor.”
> -
> -One finding is that “an adversary who runs one guard relay and one
> -exit relay with 83.3 MiB/s and 16.7 MiB/s of bandwidth respectively” has
> -“80% chance of deanonymization within 6 months” for a first stream.
> -
> -They also studied how an adversary controlling one or more ASes, or an
> -Internet eXchange Point. 80% of the modeled IRC users can have their
> -first stream deanonymized by an adversary controlling two ASes after 43
> -days.
>  
>  The author concludes with the following: “Our results do suggest that
>  current users of Tor should carefully consider if it meets their
> @@ -217,6 +188,8 @@
>  8.html
>  Arlo Breault https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/0
>  00319.html
> +Philipp Winter https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September
> +/000320.html
>  
>  Help Desk Roundup
>  -----------------
> @@ -298,7 +271,10 @@
>  
>  Upcoming events
>  ---------------
> -
> +Sep 4 8pm | Tor Q&A with Roger Dingledine
> +          | University of the Sciences, Philadelphia, PA
> +          | http://www.phillylinux.org/meetings.html
> +          |
>  Sep 29-01 | Tor at OpenITP Circumvention Tech Summit IV
>            | Berlin, Germany
>            | https://www.openitp.org/openitp/circumvention-tech-summit.html
> 
> ***************************************************************************
> 
> 
> 
> 
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