[TWN team] Updates to the wiki pages

[Lunar]

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CHANGED: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2013/9
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--- @	Tue, 03 Sep 2013 04:05:03 +0000
+++ @	Tue, 03 Sep 2013 06:05:03 +0000
@@ -70,35 +70,6 @@
 this November in Berlin, Aaron Johnson, Chris Wacek, Rob Jansen, Micah
 Sherr, and Paul Syverson described in a very well written paper their
 experiments on traffic correlation attacks.
-
-Like any low latency anonymity network, Tor is vulnerable to “an
-adversary that can observe a user’s traffic entering and exiting the
-anonymity network.” The paper extensively review previous
-litterature about this issue. But two angles used by the authors are of
-particular interests:
-
-First, they are trying to model a “more realistic adversary who monitors
-a fixed set of ASes or IXPs.” Second, they have tried to use metrics
-that can answer the following questions: “If I use the system in the
-following way, how secure am I?” or “How much can I do the following
-while maintaining security at least to level foo?”
-
-Tor has users in the real world, with real world adversaries. Both
-have resources that are limited to some extents, and it is good to
-give Tor users a better chance to estimate their risks and necessary
-tradeoffs.
-
-This lead the paper to focus on two class of attacks: “malicious relay
-operators or networks that monitor traffic as it enters and exits Tor.”
-
-One finding is that “an adversary who runs one guard relay and one
-exit relay with 83.3 MiB/s and 16.7 MiB/s of bandwidth respectively” has
-“80% chance of deanonymization within 6 months” for a first stream.
-
-They also studied how an adversary controlling one or more ASes, or an
-Internet eXchange Point. 80% of the modeled IRC users can have their
-first stream deanonymized by an adversary controlling two ASes after 43
-days.
 
 The author concludes with the following: “Our results do suggest that
 current users of Tor should carefully consider if it meets their
@@ -217,6 +188,8 @@
 8.html
 Arlo Breault https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/0
 00319.html
+Philipp Winter https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September
+/000320.html
 
 Help Desk Roundup
 -----------------
@@ -298,7 +271,10 @@
 
 Upcoming events
 ---------------
-
+Sep 4 8pm | Tor Q&A with Roger Dingledine
+          | University of the Sciences, Philadelphia, PA
+          | http://www.phillylinux.org/meetings.html
+          |
 Sep 29-01 | Tor at OpenITP Circumvention Tech Summit IV
           | Berlin, Germany
           | https://www.openitp.org/openitp/circumvention-tech-summit.html

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