[tor-talk] Traffic shaping attack

[grarpamp]

On 3/20/16, Mike Perry <mikeperry at torproject.org> wrote:
> It could also be due to the fact that Tor is effectively
> single-threaded. If something on the user's guard node, intermediate
> node, or hidden service is taking large amounts of CPU time, this will
> prevent traffic from flowing while that operation is happening. See:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16585 (though that
> ticket could use some help with clarity).

Related... why a traffic fill solution may need to reclock and transmit new
own random jitter and self limit to processable / expected bandwidth contracts
to mask network induced computation and provide for CPU headroom therein.

As with [John Gilmore's?] IEEE fill layer suggestion, there should be
a group establish outside just Tor calling for participants to look at
various crypted network fill models against now known / surmised G[P]A
methods.