[tor-talk] Bittorrent starting to move entirely within anonymous overlay nets

[Aymeric Vitte]

Le 17/06/2016 à 06:55, grarpamp a écrit :
> On 6/10/16, Mirimir <mirimir at riseup.net> wrote:
>> But there's still the traffic load. Or maybe, one could consider it as
>> chaff. Just sort of, though. Right?
> If that's the old "OMG, too much" argument... load re anon overlay nets
> may be more like bitcoin's interrelated variables... difficulty, txfees, reward,
> watts, price, txrate, etc... they'll slide nicely around to compensate until
> some unsolveable fundamental limit is reached. ie:
> Private (non-exit/I2P) use of these nets... if they slow, users will start
> talking urging more nodes, which they'll readily deploy themselves since
> private is low risk and satiates their use case. If the required node count
> to support n-million users starts blowing up CPU/RAM, devs will
> start getting poked to work on layering that. Even parallel nets
> with usage charters may arise by then as a given networks adversary
> resistance begets users begets trust begets honoring narrower charter.
> Besides, load happens to useful nets, no point trying to stave it off
> (nets are anon so staving is a no anyway), and trying to stave makes
> the stavers look stupid.
> A little education helps too, users will self regulate if they sense that,
> "Oh shit, I know this net is used for <insert activism I like>, but I can't
> even get my own <whatever> through, so I better ease up on variable <x>".

Even if an interesting move as you described (ie onions + onioncat) I
don't really think that it can scale to the extent required by a bt p2p
network, I don't think either that using hidden services is a good
solution to reach peers, and is it not an issue to have potentially
plenty of new nodes (peers) relaying the Tor traffic and decreasing the
efficiency of the Tor circuits due to their upload bandwidth?

>
> Is it chaff, and good as to filling otherwise quiet parts of the net?
> Perhaps. But as in other GPA threads, I think fill traffic may need
> to be actively managed to defeat that, rather than just flooded.

I don't know, I gave some other thoughts, let's take bitcoin that you
quoted, as far as I know it does not have any built-in features to
defeat correlation/tracking but apparently inherently defeats it

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