[tor-talk] A possible solution to traffic correlation attacks,

[mrnobody at mail-on.us]

Seems like an interesting idea, but this at the end translates into you
opening a webpage,
and it not loading for minutes. Only adding seconds or milliseconds
wouldn't avoid correlation,
or it wouldn't become much more expensive.

One other idea that comes to my mind would be to cache on the network
some amount of the
requests, or replicate part of the content of say, hidden services in
other nodes. In this way,
requests to hidden services may not reach at all the hidden service
itself, but a replica of it.
This is in a way similar to what Freenet does.


Not Friendly:
> After about an hour of brain storming I may of found a way to stop traffic correlation attacks. The idea is to add an artificial delay of a few randomized ms (two separate delays, one to the tor exit and another deal on traffic exiting the network) and add an extra chunk of randomized data (just a small random amount of KB that never exits the network). It would make traffic harder to correlate. What are your thoughts on this?


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