[tor-talk] A possible solution to traffic correlation attacks,

[Flipchan]

Got any beta code on this? Maybe add/c ode it as a daemon ?;)

Not Friendly <notfriendly at riseup.net> skrev: (5 juni 2016 16:40:52 CEST)
>After about an hour of brain storming I may of found a way to stop
>traffic correlation attacks. The idea is to add an artificial delay of
>a few randomized ms (two separate delays, one to the tor exit and
>another deal on traffic exiting the network) and add an extra chunk of
>randomized data (just a small random amount of KB that never exits the
>network). It would make traffic harder to correlate. What are your
>thoughts on this?
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Sincerly Flipchan