[tor-talk] Innocent Seattle Exit Operators And Privacy Advocates Raided

krishna e bera keb at cyblings.on.ca
Wed Apr 6 01:18:02 UTC 2016


On 04/05/2016 07:23 PM, Phil Mocek wrote:
> On 04/04/2016 03:13 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
>> On Mon, Apr 04, 2016 at 12:04:44AM -0400, krishna e bera wrote:
>>> Somewhere is a piece of advice from TorProject recommending people
>>> not to run an exit node from home for the above and other reasons.
>>
>> Actually it's EFF's Tor legal faq:
>> https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq
>> ("Should I run an exit relay from my home?")
> 
> That entry doesn't cite "above and other reasons," but only one
> reason for refraining from running an exit relay from one's home:
> risk of police seizing hardware:
> 
>     Q: Should I run an exit relay from my home?
> 
>     A: No. If law enforcement becomes interested in traffic from
>     your exit relay, it's possible that officers will seize your
>     computer. For that reason, it's best not to run your exit
>     relay in your home or using your home Internet connection.

The main "other" reason i was thinking of is that the ip addresses of
Tor relays, especially exit nodes, are blocked from many services such
as IRC and Wikipedia, and by third party filter software.  The
knowledgeable relay operator can work around this of course, but the
rest of the household may not be so flexible.

Two other problems, easily remedied with a little money:
1) cheap home internet connections are not usually allocated a static ip
address so your relay may not accumulate enough uptime to get traffic
routed to it.
2) home internet connections typically have much faster download than
upload bandwidth, and your relay is limited by the lower one.


> This leaves one to wonder if preparation for such potential
> seizure, such as isolation of "your computer" on which the exit
> runs from other computer hardware effectively satisfies EFF's
> objection to running an exit at home.

The fellow in Seattle gave the police his passwords to avoid having all
the hardware seized.  Again, is that something you want to risk for the
other denizens of the house, or your own other equipment?


-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 465 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/attachments/20160405/25efcacb/attachment.sig>


More information about the tor-talk mailing list