[tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!
Spencer
spencerone at openmailbox.org
Mon Oct 5 22:47:35 UTC 2015
Hi,
>>
>> Spencer:
>> The various bits that define your fingerprint.
>>
>
> sh-expires-12-2015 at quantentunnel.de:
> Basically, the countermeasure against such behavior is
> to stick a cookie with an hash of your fingerprint
> to your browser and deny you, as soon as it no longer
> matches.
>
Yes, but discrimination is unsupported and avoidable.
>
> If you try to spoof
>
No spoof.
>
> If you'd read the TBB design doc,
>
Quite the presumption :(
>
> you'd understand that the
> choice that was made, using a pretty real and pretty common
> user-agent, and some measures were added.
>
And as a result, Tor Browser owns up to its ID with no spoofing, as Tor
Browser users appear a Tor Browser users.
>
> using tor to connect
> to another semi-public entity (like an open proxy)
>
> The only case, were that makes sense to me is for trolling sites
>
Or using the internet. What if the OP is tired of being rejected from
visiting sites due to IP badlists and uses said proxy to appear like a
clearnet user so as not to be restricted. Google products (except for
Google Images) require this. Ix Quick and Startpage feature this.
>
> if you are so unhappy with TBB.
>
Again with the presumptions :(:(
>
> The demanded
>
Discussed
>
> feature makes
> absolutely no sense for a TBB usecase or threatmodel.
>
Will you link to the use cases and threat models in the documentation?
>
> You fail to understand
>
Fail often to succeed sooner :)
My thought is that this is being mentioned in multiple places and, if
there is any merit to undetectability, we should challenge it fully to
see; not settle with what we have and use "good enough" as an argument.
I suggested a formal proposal as the next step.
Wordlife,
Spencer
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