[tor-talk] New methods / research to detect add-ons?
pacifica at riseup.net
pacifica at riseup.net
Thu Oct 1 16:25:23 UTC 2015
>> That practice would be almost universally discouraged, except perhaps
>> for some imaginative fringe cases.
>>
>
> That's us.
Eh, I'd hesitate to say "us". I'm _not_ advocating for using add-ons in
TBB, I'm just looking for ways to quantify the damage to anonymity.
> Being part of an identified heard isn't as good as everyone
> being unique every session/circuit.
I've also got to strongly disagree here... if you're looking for
anonymity and privacy, the "herd" is strong protection against that
because trackers cannot single you out from the thousands of other
users. If you are unique, then tracking you over the current session is
trivial. Insofar that all Tor users look alike (I realize that is an
oversimplified premise), tracking across sessions is also not fruitful.
And since it's Tor, we're not really trying to hide from the fact that
we're using Tor... it doesn't make sense since the IP will always give
you away.
Again, I can't reiterate enough... I'm not advocating for using add-ons
as some have, because I do agree with the (afaik undisputed) logic that
using add-ons in TBB harms your anonymity.
Thanks,
pacifica
On 2015-09-30 07:04, Spencer wrote:
> Hi,
>
>>
>> pacifica:
>> The closest thing I'm aware of to a one-stop-shop to view the factors
>> of your fingerprint would be Valve's fingerprint.js library:
>>
>> https://github.com/Valve/fingerprintjs2
>>
>
> Thanks for this; I will definitely use it :)
>
>>
>> It's important to consider TBB's design...
>>
>
> It is. Being part of an identified heard isn't as good as everyone
> being unique every session/circuit. Though I don't think the outcome
> outweighs the effort yet, which is why we have the heard. But if that
> individuality was built in it would.
>
>>
>> That practice would be almost universally discouraged, except perhaps
>> for some imaginative fringe cases.
>>
>
> That's us.
>
> Wordlife,
> Spencer
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