[tor-talk] latest generation traffic confirmation attacks
    Mansour Moufid 
    mansourmoufid at gmail.com
       
    Sat Nov 29 00:06:29 UTC 2014
    
    
  
In case you missed it:
"On Effectiveness of Hopping-Based Spread Spectrum Techniques for
Network Forensic Traceback"
http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/ijndc.2013.1.3.3
They implemented new traffic confirmation attacks that cannot be
detected by the end points, based on some radar techniques.  They
don't mention it but the attacks can be implemented in real time.
They can also decrease the false positive rate by increasing the
bandwidth of the DSSS chip.  A patient enough attacker can have no
false positives.
    
    
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