[tor-talk] Illegal Activity As A Metric of Tor Security and Anonymity

[grarpamp]

On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 5:32 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 11:38 AM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote:
> traffic correlation is trivial if you can watch traffic in and
>       out of the network.
>> ... Tor, by design, is useless against
>>         governments that can do traffic analysis. For instance, the US
>>         government.
>
> last but not least, passive confirmation attacks are passe; the best
> attacks active.
>
> "From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types"
> http://freehaven.net/doc/batching-taxonomy/taxonomy.pdf

Pending a second read of such papers... I still think a network
that uses fixed external packet sizes and fills internode links
with chaff versions of same to meet some fixed clock rate...
would be more resistant to this. Afaik no network has tried
this yet.