[tor-talk] 'How to report bad relays' (blog entry)

Nusenu BM-2D8wMEVgGVY76je1WXNPfo8SrpZt5yGHES at bitmessage.ch
Wed Jul 30 23:03:03 UTC 2014


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Hi,

quoting from [1].

> If it's reproducible, we attempt to get in touch with the relay 
> operator

Does this imply that you try to fix the issue with an confirmed "bad
relay" before assigning them the badexit flag?
(opposed to flagging them first - which means protecting users first and
then trying to get this fixed? - removing the flags after recovery)


> In severe cases, we [(currently Roger, Peter, Damian, Karsten, and
>  I)] are also able to remove the relay descriptor from the network
>  consensus which effectively makes the relay disappear.

from the comment reply to this sentence:
> If a sufficient number of directory authority operators agree
> (which is not always the case), then they are able to disable a
> selected relay. This happens every other day or week when we
> discover a malicious or broken relay. Also, our directory authority
> operators as well as their servers are in different jurisdiction
> which makes political attacks harder.

(yes, "a sufficient number of directory authority operators" is
probably more accurate than "we")

..but are you really saying that "every other day or week" the
majority of dir auth. operators are "removing a relay descriptor from
the network consensus"?
(making them "disappear" opposed to giving them i.e. the badexit flag)

If the removal rate is so high ("every other day or week") where can
we find a list of all relays that have been removed from the consensus
in the past so far?
This process should be transparent, no?

I tried to find 'rejected' flagged relays on the following page but
wasn't successful.
https://consensus-health.torproject.org/

thanks!



[1] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/how-report-bad-relays


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