[tor-talk] Why does requesting for bridges by email require a Yahoo or Gmail address?

[isis]

Mirimir transcribed 1.1K bytes:
> On 07/25/2014 11:31 PM, grarpamp wrote:
> 
> <SNIP>
> 
> > Do we underestimate the social net in oppressed that gives
> > them awareness of tor, and to obtain binary and share bridge
> > info in the first place? 
> 
> Maybe we do. But what about carelessness, poor judgment and the
> prevalence of informers? Wouldn't it be better to have a system that
> protected bridges by design?
> 
> > Or that oppressor will not burn $cheap govt SIM and IP army
> > to get and block bridges from gmail to @getbridges?
> 
> Right. Requiring hard-to-get email addresses does make it harder to get
> bridge IPs. But who does that impact the most, potential users or
> adversaries? Is there relevant evidence?
> 
> > This is difficult.
> 
> Indeed.
> 
> Please excuse the repetition, but DNS-based fast flux (Proximax) with
> selection-based dropping of domain names associated with bridge blocking
> is the best possibility that I've seen. Rather than trying to prevent
> adversaries from joining the system, it recursively isolates based on
> behavior.


I actually like the rBridge design better. [0]


[0]: https://people.torproject.org/~isis/papers/rBridge:%20User%20Reputation%20based%20Tor%20Bridge%20Distribution%20with%20Privacy%20Preservation.copy%20with%20notes.pdf

-- 
 ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
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