[tor-talk] Spoiled Onions

[William Conlow]

I have a basic question about the Spoiled Onions report. The bad onions
mean that someone could block traffic, could re-direct traffic, or
otherwise censor content, but they couldn't de-anonymize users nor could
they prevent user from re-connecting to Tor network with different nodes.

Do I understand the story? If so, am I correct?


On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 10:36 AM, Elysius <elysius at lelantos.org> wrote:

> The more I read about various exit node exploits, the more convinced I
> am that Tor's future is in beefing up hidden service functions and
> keeping as much traffic as possible within the Tor network.
>
> I hope that the Tor developers see this the same way. Expanding the
> usefulness of hidden services is the way for Tor to grow and be accepted.
>
> Elysius
>
> On 22/01/14 12:32 AM, ramo at goodvikings.com wrote:
> >
> http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/01/scientists-detect-spoiled-onions-trying-to-sabotage-tor-privacy-network/
>
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-- 
William N. Conlow
Rutgers--Camden Law, 2013