[tor-talk] Regarding FAQ: "Do I get better anonymity if I run a relay?"

Michael Wolf mikewolf53 at gmail.com
Fri Sep 13 20:20:50 UTC 2013


On 9/13/2013 1:56 AM, Michael Wolf wrote:
> From the Tor FAQ:
> https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#BetterAnonymity
>
>> "Do I get better anonymity if I run a relay?
>>
>> Yes, you do get better anonymity against some attacks.
>>
>> The simplest example is an attacker who owns a small number of Tor
>> relays. He will see a connection from you, but he won't be able to
>> know whether the connection originated at your computer or was
>> relayed from somebody else."
>
> I'm wondering if this is actually the case.
> ...


  Just to be clear here, my intent is not to say "Tor doesn't do what it
says it does", or anything of the sort.  If my points are correct, I'm
suggesting that the FAQ be updated to reflect this reality, and perhaps
instead stress the ways that running a relay indirectly improves your
anonymity.

  For example, running a relay increases both the node diversity and the
total bandwidth of the network, which encourages more users to use Tor.
 The more Tor users, the lower the probability that any given traffic at
an exit node belongs to you.  This could be listed as an indirect benefit.

  One might also suggest that increasing network bandwidth improves user
experience -- and happy Tor users are more likely to add relays to the
network or suggest Tor to a friend, who might setup a relay.  As before,
increased node diversity and traffic improve anonymity for everyone.

  There could still be mention that running an Entry Guard can give you
even more anonymity -- I just think it needs clarified more that simply
running a (middle) relay does not mean the next node can't tell if the
traffic belongs to you or not.  (That is, assuming the points in my
previous email were correct).

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