[tor-talk] What if I connect to all nsa Tor nodes?

[Noilson Caio]

in https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#EntryGuards say:

...

So, what should we do? Suppose the attacker controls, or can observe,
*C*relays. Suppose there are
*N* relays total. If you select new entry and exit relays each time you use
the network, the attacker will be able to correlate all traffic you send
with probability *(c/n)2*. But profiling is, for most users, as bad as
being traced all the time: they want to do something often without an
attacker noticing, and the attacker noticing once is as bad as the attacker
noticing more often. Thus, choosing many random entries and exits gives the
user no chance of escaping profiling by this kind of attacker.



Today there are:

N = +/- 4000  [1]

C = number of relay (relay over ISP, traffic **between Ases and IXPS factor
) observed from NSA - are there studies that indicate the amount of relay,
ixps, isp, compromised by nsa?


thanks.

[1] - https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html


...


On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 3:28 PM, Nathan Suchy <
theusernameiwantistaken at gmail.com> wrote:

> Is it possible for me to force my client to connect to my tor exit as the
> middle node?
>
>
> On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 1:11 PM, Paul Syverson <syverson at itd.nrl.navy.mil
> >wrote:
>
> > On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 11:47:06AM -0400, Nathan Suchy wrote:
> > > Would my traffic still be secure?
> > >
> >
> > To do what, and secure against whom and to what degree?
> >
> > It is reasonable to assume that if NSA is running Tor nodes, then they
> > are probably using good operational security. So against someone
> > breaking into those nodes and then attacking you, you are probably
> > more secure than using random nodes. (But see below.)
> >
> > If you mean secure against the NSA node operators, then no. Any
> > adversary that owns all the nodes in your route should be able to
> > learn pretty much everything about your traffic patterns, who you're
> > talking to and when. This is true for the NSA or anybody else.
> >
> > If you mean intentionally selecting some subset of nodes because you
> > trust them more or because you are trying to avoid them as adversary
> > nodes, there is a tradeoff between the potential better security that
> > might provide and what your choice might reveal about you. cf.
> > "Trust-based Anonymous Communication: Adversary Models and Routing
> > Algorithms". There's currently research advances but no simple advice
> > on that score.
> >
> > This all assumes adversaries just live at the nodes rather than also
> > at the ISPs, the ASes, the IXPs, etc. It is hard to say anything more
> > about such an adversary without more details. You might want to see
> > "Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor By Realistic
> > Adversaries" and some of the earlier work on this issue cited therein.
> >
> > HTH,
> > Paul
> > --
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> >
>
>
>
> --
> Nathan Suchy
> If this email was not intended for you delete it and any copies you have of
> it. The email was intended for "FirstName LastName". Information in this
> email may be confidential and releasing it may be a violation of US law.
> --
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>



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