[tor-talk] New paper : Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries
Roger Dingledine
arma at mit.edu
Tue Sep 3 18:09:58 UTC 2013
On Mon, Sep 02, 2013 at 03:22:33PM +0000, adrelanos wrote:
> Roger Dingledine:
> > And we really should raise the guard rotation period. If you
> > do their compromise graphs again with guards rotated every nine months,
> > they look way different."
>
> TBB releases are more frequent than every nine months. With each TBB
> release, people are getting new entry guards. Are there plans to address
> this?
Excellent point. This is a good argument for being able to unpack a new
TBB on top of the old one -- which I'm told usually works, but doesn't
always work, and that's a big problem.
Longer term, the right answer is to use the Firefox update mechanism in
TBB 3.0 to update, in place, only the parts that need updating.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4234
...unless there are better answers?
--Roger
More information about the tor-talk
mailing list