[tor-talk] Thoughts on Tor-based social networking?

Yawning Angel yawning at schwanenlied.me
Mon Oct 28 11:30:10 UTC 2013


On Sun, 27 Oct 2013 20:17:30 -0400
Bill Cox <waywardgeek at gmail.com> wrote: 
> Thanks for the links, Roger.  On the first thread, I agree with you
> that exit nodes should not be expected to analyze the unencrypted
> traffic to determine if behavior is acceptable.  That's what NSA exit
> nodes are for :-p  However, OpenDNS style filtering should be
> acceptable, IMO.  It'd be a simple set of flags that each exit node
> says it supports or blocks, so it could be fairly simple for Tor
> users to route to an acceptable exit node.  I would want the same
> flags for relay nodes as well.  That would block some sites people
> don't want to redirect, such as porn sites 
> - not that I have issues with porn.  I just don't want to waste my 
> bandwidth routing it.

I'm really confused how you expect "middle relays" to implement this
sort of filtering, given that *by design*, the middle relays are
ignorant of the destination of the traffic.

Oh I know, we could add a bit in the cell header that signifies if the
cell is carrying "objectionable or evil" payload a la (RFC 3514), and
it will be up for compliant implementations to tag their packets when
they're watching pron, so that relays can filter/censor traffic as
appropriate.  There's probably fairly "interesting" anonymity
implications when certain relays won't ever be eligible to be part of
your path as well.

(As a side note how do you know that they were watching pron through
your exit?  It's usually considered a bad idea for various reasons to
look at user traffic.)

Regards,

-- 
Yawning Angel
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