[tor-talk] Padding effective against simple passive end-to-end correlation attacks?

[Raynardine]

On 1/26/2013 8:57 AM, adrelanos wrote:
> Question:
> Isn't it significantly more difficult for the adversary to find out who
> is behind Alice's actions, when choosing Behavior B? It gets more
> difficult than just comparing time stamps?

I think that dummy traffic on sustained circuits to one's entry guards
is a good idea.

You could make it an optional feature in torrc.

I would also suggest garlic routing as an optional feature, by this I
mean introducing very small delays in order to transmit bundles of
transmissions together in order to make traffic analysis and correlation
significantly more expensive and tedious for the adversary.

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