[tor-talk] NSA supercomputer
Christian Sturm
reezer at reezer.org
Sat Apr 6 08:48:13 UTC 2013
Anthony Papillion wrote:
> . Granted, quantum computing
> will shred most (all?) of the ciphers we currently use.
Which actually is a bit sad, cause RSA appears to be replaceable
Latice-based cryptography:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lattice_based_cryptography
As the article says though one needs to choose one of two drawbacks
here, performance or proven(!) security. They are intersting, cause they
are not NP-Hard and still can't be attacked by today's knowledge. There
is at least one alternative that is hard for quantum computers and in
fact is NP-Hard, which is the McEliece cryptosystem. However it has
properties that appear to basically render it insecure.
One hast to also keep in mind that the symmetric algorithm to be fast
enough. I don't know - or better said, I didn't find - anything about
this topic yet. In general one shouldn't forget that the attacker can
always "simply" use the weaker cipher and currently it really seems to
be AES, because it's harder to know about its propertierties, being not
simply based on prime numbers. Also there are a number of attacks on it
now, some of them that maybe someone could find out about how they can
be used correctly.
But still, the chances of finding an attack against an application that
reveals the plaintext in some way is something that's a way more likely
threat and attacks against applications are something that constantly
happens. Bad behavior, timing attacks, etc. are a way more realistic
attack vector. And hey, they can try to figure out who sends traffic
that is encrypted and appears in certain intervals, etc. making them
look suspicious and visit them. That's where Tor outperforms stuff like
VPN that is easier to analyze it seems, cause all the do is encrypting
traffic.
I hope someone finds some flaws in this and tells me, cause I wanna know
whether I am right about all this.
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