[tor-talk] [tor-dev] resistance to rubberhose and UDP questions

[tor at lists.grepular.com]

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On 06/10/12 23:37, Maxim Kammerer wrote:

>> "TRESOR is only compatible with real hardware. Run- ning TRESOR
>> as guest inside a virtual machine is gen- erally insecure as the
>> guest?s registers are stored in the host?s main memory."
> 
> This is irrelevant to my example.

Yes. I replied too quickly to your email and realised my mistake
shortly afterwards. Hence the second email.

>> Also, the encryption/decryption is done using a key derived from
>> the password which you enter at the very beginning of boot up.
>> Not with the password or key you provide to cryptsetup/luks. This
>> wasn't clear to me when I wrote the blog post which I linked to.
>> It's all in the PDF.
> 
> I see now ? so they break the assumption that one needs to provide
> a correct password to open a volume in LUKS after it is closed,
> for instance.

Yes. They do that. As is documented. I guess this is one of the
reasons why it's not in the mainline kernel.

- -- 
Mike Cardwell  https://grepular.com/     http://cardwellit.com/
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XMPP OTR Key   8924 B06A 7917 AAF3 DBB1  BF1B 295C 3C78 3EF1 46B4
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