[tor-talk] What's written to HD?

[Webmaster]

Your last line of

"but some things need an understanding of  more fundamental concepts before they make sense."

Should be Followed with the other line you used:

"...this is not under the control of the Tor Browser."
  

Sorry I couldn't resist  :)


On 11/17/2012 10:25 AM, Julian Yon wrote:
> On Sat, 17 Nov 2012 08:24:35 +0000 (GMT)
> Dan Hughes <danhughes146 at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> The question of swap files and hibernation raised by someone else is
>> pretty fundamental. It's pointless and misleading just talking
>> pedantically about disk cache as it doesn't matter to the user
>> exactly what blows the gaff.
>>
>> As far as I can tell: if you want to keep the computer clean, then
>> use Tails. If you want to be anonymous, best bet is latest TBB. If
>> you want both...then who knows ...
>>
>> Some of you guys need a bit more understanding for us noobs who don't
>> know what we're talking about.
> You asked a technical question and got several technical answers. But if
> you are asking to be patronised, here goes: Nobody on this list can
> give you any guarantees about software they have neither written nor
> audited. Nor can they give you any guarantees about a computer system
> they don't administer, including yours. This isn't a pedantic
> technicality, it's just fact. Having got that out of the way, here are
> some things to consider:
>
> Tor Browser doesn't write anything sensitive to permanent storage. What
> your OS does is not under the control of the Tor Browser.
>
> Tor Browser doesn't include Flash, so Flash concerns are irrelevant.
> What standard Firefox (or any other browser) does is not under the
> control of the Tor Browser.
>
> What your OS chooses to write to its swap file(s) is not under the
> control of the Tor Browser.
>
> If you don't want your OS to use swap, then turn off swap. Most modern
> systems have enough RAM to run perfectly well without it. How to
> achieve this depends on what OS you're running. This is not under the
> control of the Tor Browser. On some systems it is possible to use
> encrypted swap, which is generally a good idea. It does reduce
> performance under load, but if you're swapping heavily already that's
> probably not your first concern.
>
> If you don't want to write hibernation data, don't hibernate. This is
> not under the control of the Tor Browser.
>
> If you don't trust your proprietary OS (e.g. Windows, OS X), run
> a free/open source one such as GNU/Linux or FreeBSD. This is not under
> the control of the Tor Browser. It's not wise to trust proprietary
> software with your anonymity. Many of the "open questions" about what
> is, or isn't, written to disk will be related to this point, and you
> should take it seriously. You should assume that, given sufficient
> incentive, Microsoft or Apple will implement any back door that Big
> Brother desires. Again, this is not under the control of the Tor
> Browser.
>
> If you feel you would be safer running in a VM and deleting the entire
> VM afterwards, you are free to do so. This is not under the control of
> the Tor Browser. Please note that in general deleting a file does not
> remove its contents from the underlying storage immediately. The
> standard technique to compensate for this is to overwrite the file
> in-place at least once before deleting (and many authorities will tell
> you that once is not enough). Note that if you're running a log
> structured or versioning file system (unlikely, but you haven't said
> that you're not) then this trick just won't work.
>
> Related to the above, secure deletion is near impossible to ensure on
> an SSD (flash based main storage, as found in some high end laptops
> but also in netbooks, tablets etc). If this bothers you (and if you're
> using the above technique, it probably does), don't use an SSD; use a
> traditional hard disk. This is not under the control of the Tor Browser.
>
> If after considering all of the above you are still feeling paranoid,
> remove all the writeable storage from your computer and run entirely
> from a live CD/DVD (*not* a USB key; if you don't trust TBB not to
> write to your main storage, you shouldn't trust it not to write to
> anything; similarly, you will want to use a write-once medium, i.e. not
> CD/DVD±RW). This *does not have to be TAILS*. You can run many
> GNU/Linux based OSes straight from their install DVDs (I recommend
> Xubuntu for ease of use), install TBB into its ramdisk, and run from
> there. The one TAILS feature you may miss is the cold-boot attack
> mitigation. Therefore you'll want to remove the main memory chips from
> the computer after you finish and incinerate them. Ok, that's a bit
> extreme. You're probably fine if you just reboot and run something that
> uses a lot of memory. Unless you think a cold-boot attack is likely
> (i.e. you're actively being watched by a well prepared government
> agency sitting outside your front door) then you probably don't need to
> worry about that. In any case, this is not under the control of the Tor
> Browser.
>
> If your computer has been physically compromised, then even these
> precautions may not save you. Have you ever let it out of sight at
> airport security? Been arrested while carrying it? Found an intruder in
> your home/office? Then all bets are off. Big Brother could have
> discreetly installed some hardware which monitors what you're doing,
> regardless of what's written to disk. This is not under the control of
> the Tor Browser.
>
> If all this is still too technical, then you may be putting yourself at
> risk by using the Internet, ever. This really isn't something that the
> Tor Browser, or any other software, can help with. If you're concerned
> by your own lack of knowledge then book yourself into a computer
> science course at your local college or university and take modules
> related to operating systems, networks, security, cryptography and
> semantics. Unfortunately this is an advanced field and declaring
> yourself to be a 'noob' doesn't change that. By all means if you have
> more questions then ask them, but some things need an understanding of
> more fundamental concepts before they make sense.
>
>
> Regards,
> Julian
>
>
>
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