[tor-talk] Tor and HTTPS graphic

[Maxim Kammerer]

On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 02:27, Ted Smith <tedks at riseup.net> wrote:
> I'm not a full-time PET researcher, but smarter people than myself in this thread seem to think the GPA is
> more of a myth than a reality.

Using https://metrics.torproject.org/csv/relaycountries.csv:

$ grep 2012-03-05 relaycountries.csv | cut -d, -f2-3 | tr , ' ' | sort
-rn -k 2 | grep -v ' [0-9]$' | pr -t4
us 778            it 42             dk 24             ro 15
de 507            at 40             no 21             il 15
fr 170            cz 38             lt 21             ar 12
ru 169            pl 33             sc 20             br 11
nl 166            fi 33             lu 20             sk 10
zz 138            ch 33             es 17             nz 10
se 111            au 29             hu 16             gr 10
gb 107            ua 28             be 16             bg 10
ca 80             jp 24

>From a cursory glance, all countries on the list (assuming that "zz"
is satellite or unclassified, and with the exception of Russia) are
NATO countries or similar, sharing electronic intelligence with the
USA. Russia is a potential war adversary, so its communications
interception is high-priority for the USA as well. In summary, the
traffic channels of absolute majority of Tor relays (Internet
backbones and satellite links) are easily accessible by the US
intelligence agencies. Intercepting and correlating all Tor traffic is
thus a question of willpower and resources prioritization, not
viability.

-- 
Maxim Kammerer
Liberté Linux (discussion / support: http://dee.su/liberte-contribute)