[tor-talk] What happen if one create 2000 exit nodes for 6 hours?

[Andrew]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

On 11/21/2011 10:14 AM, Damian Johnson wrote:
> Hi Fabio. What you're describing is a sybil attack. An attacker 
> definitely *wouldn't* get a majority of the exit traffic for those 
> destinations - clients weigh relay selection by heuristics reported
> by the bandwidth authorities. Those authorities take a long time to
> warm up to new relays, so it would take quite a bit of uptime
> before they'd start seeing a substantial chunk of traffic.
> 
> Also, we'd get an alarm and cut them out of the consensus, for an
> example see... 
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/badRelays#trotsky
>
>  short summary: 747 exits suddenly appeared and were dropped from
> the consensus
> 
> That said, smaller and slower sybil adversaries could go undetected
> so if you see something fishy then let us know! -Damian 
> _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing
> list tor-talk at lists.torproject.org 
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk


Good thing we trust Moritz, torservers.net is growing. :P


Disclaimer: I have spoken with Moritz in the past and is very aware of
these type of concerns and was making efforts to mitigate them.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/

iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJOyovzAAoJEJW/J8aB8dYIfbcIALOXkir+dsBSP0vAay7e7zx4
U6LMX4ZzDhpJz3kaQnl39e+EvZeCnFMtVAhbhVZlN7yLPf4n6u8vCc/IWuoF7ie+
CI28fEZ8EKLNbOmBeDd2bhKVqKMYVeE2Hk7PL/YR1pPUb6mR15PqliaLA3jS9FGc
G8Jerya7teyTvx0b9JPxch+KN4FW+hrys+GwWOz1HIxZ/z4aehFkmKWqSin2dEQH
vfvn9GTVw/8CqvTSNKE9M1O1WMcknHuwrj3mwiL0aqRHuA8HE0sl80/ONUNgIunY
vCTbkly/UuKhUwC4PGiVImVt7fJPdebJg9WGBWCWPekGUtf1B83TfszXLh1wrho=
=EKqx
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----