Is "gatereloaded" a Bad Exit?

[tor at lists.grepular.com]

On 31/01/2011 13:11, Jan Weiher wrote:

>> Assuming the worse, and disregarding volunteer exit bandwidth without
>> some proper investigation, doesn't sound like a good approach to me...
> 
> Nobody does that, but I think its fair to say that if you want that
> somebody can contact you about your node, you publish your contact
> details in the directory. And if you enter wrong contact infos, you made
> clear that you dont want to be contacted.

I don't think you can make that assumption. Maybe they just didn't want
their email address to be public for spam bots to harvest. Maybe they're
just used to not publishing their email address unless they really have
to. Safest course of action: Figure out how to contact them, and ask them.

> I think marking them as "bad"
> and waiting for the admin to show up is the easiest way to go. Lets call
> it a "cry"-test. Just wait until someone shows up and cries.

It's the easiest, but the least efficient route. Somebody mentioned 6%
of Exit bandwidth. How much effort would be spent trying to increase the
capacity of the network by 6% via coding and/or publicity? Probably a
lot more effort than would be required to try and contact these Exit
owners and maybe retain the bandwidth.

You make it sound as though running an Exit node is a privilege and that
people who run them somehow owe the Tor project? They're volunteering
bandwidth, for the benefit of the network. If you don't treat volunteers
well, they will go elsewhere, and the people who lose out are the people
who use the Tor network, not the people who previously ran Exit nodes.

Exit bandwidth is a scarce and valuable resource, and should be treated
as such.

-- 
Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/  https://twitter.com/mickeyc
Professional  http://cardwellit.com/ http://linkedin.com/in/mikecardwell
PGP.mit.edu   0018461F/35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F

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