Is "gatereloaded" a Bad Exit?

[Christopher A. Lindsey]

On Sat, 2011-01-29 at 22:45 -0800, Mike Perry wrote: 
> Thus spake Eddie Cornejo (cornejo at gmail.com):
> 
> > Forgive my ignorance but this seeks rather knee-jerk to me. Maybe I'm
> > missing something.
> 
> Yeah, I believe you're missing the fact that these ports also contain
> plaintext passwords than can be used to gain access to information on
> these and other accounts that may or may not have ever traveled over
> tor. That is the difference.
> 
> > Finally there is no way that an exit node can directly affect the mode
> > choices by a client. Ie, apart from a particular node existing, there
> > is no way that a node could force a user to use it.
> 
> See above.
>  
> > Therefore I submit that having these nodes, whether they are overtly
> > recording traffic or not, does not result in any harm to the TOR
> > network. In fact, their presence lessens the burden on the TOR network
> > as they are providing much needed bandwidth.
> 
> We don't need bandwidth that bad.
>  
> > So, what's the threat? Why are you considering banning these nodes
> > when, by all accounts, I cannot see them having a negative impact on
> > the network as a whole (in fact, it's probably a positive influence)
> 
> I believe that allowing these nodes sends a message that we are OK
> with people monitoring plaintext traffic, because it is anonymized. We
> have never been OK with this.
> 
> People use plaintext at their own risk, and yes, they should know
> better, but this does NOT mean that we are comfortable feeding them to
> the wolves.
> 
> If said exits are really interested in helping, they should alter
> their exit policy to allow encryption and then rekey. They will be
> banned by identity key, not by IP. Rekeying without fixing the exit
> policy will just result in IP bans.
> 

Could it be that these nodes have set these policies to reduce the
possibility of being approached because of illegal activity passing
through them?  It could be they believe that they're helping with the
project and limiting their exposure as "bad guys" wouldn't use clear
text.

Take care,
Chris
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