Is "gatereloaded" a Bad Exit?

[Robert Ransom]

On Sun, 30 Jan 2011 10:33:31 +0100
Jan Weiher <jan at buksy.de> wrote:

> > At some point, we intend to shrink exit policies further as Tor scales
> > to more decentralized schemes. Those exit policies will likely be
> > represented as bits representing subsets of ports. When that time
> > comes, we will very likely combine encrypted and unencrypted versions
> > of ports together, removing this option entirely.

> Sounds good. But what to do for now? Just creating a list of nodes which
> only allow unencrypted traffic and put them into the ExcludeExitNodes
> list? Shouldnt these nodes be excluded by default?

They will be now.

The exit scanner detects such nodes, and Mike Perry has just made it
easier to mark nodes with suspicious policies with the BadExit flag in
the future:

https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git/commitdiff/2320961a05e3277534887c7f76036c826a879230


Robert Ransom
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